“Letters have sounds” or the Phonology of the Greek Stoikheia

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Summary: Linguists, still today, are puzzled by language origins. In this regard, although there is progress, modern explanations are often just a little less insufficient than are ancient ones. Indeed, it is also a question, how insufficient, and in which sense, ancient explanations are. Explanatory attempts have always been numerous, and in some cases, suggestions in such far-off areas as Greece and India show similarities to which a common

1. The double-faced god Ianus is speaking. (Ianus may have been originally a “threshold-godhead”. His figure and name have not been satisfactorily interpreted but the cosmological dimension with this god, too, seems to be probable (see e.g. Thraede 1994: 1279–1281).  
2. “Yon lucid air and the three other bodies, fire, water, earth, were huddled all in one. When once, through the discord of its elements, the mass parted, dissolved, and went in diverse ways to seek new homes, flame sought the height, air filled the nearer space, while earth and sea sank in the middle deep. ’Twas then that I, till that time a mere ball, a shapeless lump, assumed the face and members of a god” (Ovid, Fasti I, 105–109. Text and translation cited according to the Loeb edition, Cambridge, Ma. – London 1989. Translation by Sir J.G. Frazer, revised by G.P. Goold, pp. 10–11). J.G. Frazer, in his 1929 edition (vol. II, p. 101), remarks to this passage: “So the early Ionic philosopher Anaximander supposed that at the genesis of this our world the elements of heat and cold parted, and a globe of flame encircled the air about the earth, till pieces of it, breaking off and condensing into balls, formed the sun, moon, and stars.”
layer must underly. Strikingly, the ancient discussions which imply both philosophical and mythological (cosmological) considerations find modern parallels in interpreting exactly the same dimensions where cosmic and linguistic expansion show a similar shape, and structural conformity might be more than a chance correspondence in form. It is the two, at first sight, remote, lines this paper tries to work along: ancient traditions on language, heavily bound to mythology, and modern linguistic analysis. With regard to the latter, we confine ourselves to the “letters”: why are the “letters” the entities which “have sounds”, and if they have, what kind of “sound” these were. This tries to be a phonological approach, and since the survey of the whole alphabet might be excessive, we narrow down the discussion to some questions of the consonantal system, already tackled elsewhere (Katonis 2011) that may be conceived as important. In this regard, any scholarly grammar of Ancient Greek (see e.g. Schwyzer 1939: 179) or any appropriate phonological textbook can persuade that Ancient Greek had, unlike its vowel system, an unbalanced consonantal set whereas Modern Greek acquired, in this regard, a fully integrated pattern. This paper would undertake the parallel investigation in order to get insights into the way the Greek phonological system works. The issue, however, is not merely the case of a sound-pattern. It is also about understanding to which extent the Ancient Greek system was unbalanced and why, and what the phonetic–phonological reality under orthography was. Schwyzer’s early construction about the two phases of Greek neither shows nor attempts at any systematic presentation of either stage of the language and, with regard to the consonants as a functional set, modern surveys, too, may lack the systemic presentation. A reader, new to the issue, might be surprised and ask what common between the two stages of the language there is. Greek, undoubtedly, one of the best, if not the best, subject for any kind of linguistic investigation, certainly allows for numerous insights. Beside a pure material for study, tradition handed down in Greek literacy deals with linguistic issues important enough to comment on. These informations, too, in a comparative approach, and to a certain extent beyond linguistics, have also been examined. A recent thought provoking joint publication (2010) by
the physicist D. Nanopoulos\(^3\) and the linguist G. Babiniotis\(^4\) (University of Athens) has also been taken into consideration.

First I will discuss language, as supposed by the ancients to have been given by a god or a god-inspired man as an argument to explain linguistic conservatism, secondly the mytho-poetic name-giving formula and ceremony as reflecting both language “creation” and naming things and persons, then I’ll have a look at the question of “letters” which were believed to have sounds, and lastly I’ll try to give a phonetic-phonological evaluation to the set of /b\ d\ g/ – orthographically {β\ δ\ γ} for Ancient Greek, and {μπ\ ντ\ γκ} for the modern language – taken as example, and suggest how they might have been pronounced in different periods of the Greek language. These issues open up also philosophical problems, as well as theological depths which will be touched upon to the extent it is proper here. Thus, so that we take an example, such an important grammarian as Dionysius Halicarnassensis cannot really be understood without a philosophical framework; in his case, a controversy of principles with the Stoics, represented by Chrysippus, is operative which included such subtle terminological issues as synthesis vs syntaxis (see Wiater 2011, e.g. pp. 239 ff.).

[on synthesis see Tarn Steiner 1994: 116–117].

1. Whereas modern language sciences explore linguistic facts and try to understand their nature, i.e. they are descriptive and explanatory, traditional grammar has always had a teaching tenor, and a concern of how something should be realized or understood rather than how it was actually being understood or spoken or written.

\(^3\) Dimitris Nanopoulos (University of Texas A\&M) is one of the leading astrophysicists of our time and one of the most regularly cited scientists in the world, cited more than 35,800 times over across a number of separate branches of science, proponent, among others, of the Flipped SU(5) Theory and of Superstrings. Being engaged, beside questions concerning the origins of the Universe, also in quantum-inspired models of brain function, in his talks with Babiniotis in Athens, he gave an idea (Nanopoulos – Babiniotis 2010: 77–78) how linguists could tackle the language origins issue experimentally, to which Babiniotis reacted (p. 80) positively. (See ib., pp. 203–205 for more details).

\(^4\) Georgios Babiniotis (Emeritus and Honorary Professor of the University of Athens), author of a large number of papers and books comprising topics from the history of Greek to education, is today the leading linguist in Greece. After G.N. Hatzidakis, it is him who first published treatises and books on theoretical linguistics complying fully with international standards. The present writer remembers that, on the threshold of the new millennium, in his classes, Babiniotis was reluctant – like most linguists – to discuss the language origins issue referring it to philosophy. The talks in question, however, discuss, among others, the unification problem in science (the Grand Unification Theories or GUTs in Nanopoulos’ thinking, cf. pp. 203–204), and Babiniotis now expresses himself more leniently toward the issue (see remark above). (For more details on his rich work see ib. pp. 201–203).
Accordingly, Dionysius Thrax (D.T., 2nd c. B.C.), the author of the first modern European grammar, made it clear that this discipline was concerned with written (as sanctioned by tradition, I would add) linguistic forms leaving real spoken language aside:

"La grammaire est la connaissance empirique de ce qui se dit couramment chez les poètes et les prosateurs" (Lallot 1989: 41). 5

Thus, it appears that even the concept “grammar” (cf. γράμμα, ‘letter’) originates from the written dimension of human language, 6 and, moreover, the discipline of the “letters” is approached as a kind of “art”. How to explain, then, the strange dual condition of clinging to spoken language (i.e. oral tradition) on the one hand and to the “letters” as a reference point on the other, not ignoring either that the descriptions are sometimes contradictory and that the terminology is not always consistent? And what were “letters” (γράμματα) and “elements” (στοιχεῖα) indeed?

Far from Greece, but not very differently in its practice, Indian phonetics was concerned with the need of the ritual importance of speech: the need to preserve sacred texts and ritually potent utterances in the oral tradition of Sanskrit (Rocher 1997: 141). Phonetics in Ancient India is called ʂิกsa. Strictly speaking this was one of the two main categories, less specific and therefore more suitable when speaking of the Indian influence on Western phonetics (Allen 1953: 3–5; cf. also pp. IX–X). The subjects of the ʂıkṣā are identified with such categories as ‘sound–unit’, ‘tone’, ‘quantity’, ‘degree of buccal closure’ etc. (Allen ib., p. 5[3]). Literally this word means ‘the study’, and this is well understandable if we think of the attempt to

5. "Γραμματική ἐστιν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεύσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων" (GG I, I. p. 5, Uhlig; Lallot, ib. p. 40).

6. Classical authors will be cited, with a few exceptions, according to the convention used in classical philology, as found e.g. in the Liddell–Scott–Jones Lexicon. To the Tekhne Grammatike, of which the passage is cited, cf. some commentaries like that of Pecorella (1962) and Lallot (1989). In translating the passages, I try to keep myself to the most reliable or genuine renderings. There is also an English translation, based, however, on the French one: ‘Grammar is the empirical knowledge of what poet and prose writers commonly say’. As Matthews (2001: 1198) remarks, this is the rendering by D. Whitehouse based on the French one by J. Lallot. Matthews (ib. p. 1193) remarks that the γραμματικοί were by profession teachers, concerned above all with the maintenance of a written standard, based on the Attic Greek of many centuries earlier, from which the spoken language was increasingly diverging. Cf., further, Hermann who underlines several times the same divergence, and the priority of the written dimension as well as the didactic aim (1923: 124.125.127.128.129.130("Schulweisheit").

[γραμματικός ↔ διαλεκτικός, dialecticien (Méridier 1931: 14+)]

6. D.T. may have given the summary of an age–long controversy. Cf. to this insight the philosophical dimensions on which, as a rule, the grammatical observations were based (e.g. Long 2000: 341 ff., and 2000(a): 477).

7. To be precise, ʂıkṣā, and later ʂıkṣā. Its categories were fundamental for all further linguistic studies as was its pure interest in sounds rather than letters (Scharfe 1977: 78).
preserve the sacred texts not only through their words but also through their correct pronunciation. Much earlier than Allen, Weber concluded that this term must refer to the oral tradition (“mündliche Tradition”) rather than to one certain text (1853: 211–212, 1858a: 104, 1858b: 345 ff.). A full immersion into the Indian tradition is not possible, it is, however, necessary to remark that this tradition both has remarkable affinities with the classical one and, in a frame that may be called Comparative Philology, complements the issue.

The power of vāc (language, speech) has intrigued Indian thinkers from the earliest times. Words were not merely the poet’s tools, and not only the magic keys by which the officiating priest opened the door to prosperity and heavenly bliss. Often Speech was seen as a casual force behind even the gods and the universe. At an early date, Speech was visualized as the cosmic Cow, and her steps (pada) were first taken as the lines of the verse. An advanced analysis saw in her steps the single words, and the usually four lines of a verse were henceforth called the ‘feet’ or pāda (Scharfe 1977: 77).

In the Rigveda Brahman (the Absolute, “all the enigmas of the universe”) is equated with language (vāk). More exactly, vāk– would appear in compounds, and for lemma one usually posits vāc. Vāk– stands, naturally, in etymological relationship with Latin vox (‘voice’, ‘sound’). Patañjali, Pāṇini’s commentator, says: “we are the upholders of the authority


9. The aim of this paper is not to go further than India and the IE dimension. One may consider, however, that Chinese thinking, too, arrived at examining the “Rectification of names” that reminds of the Hermogenes – Cratylus controversy as given by Plato; more linguistically, the coexistence of the arbitrariness and iconicity, and social and biological perspectives. See Lien (1994) on the linguistic thoughts of Xun Zi (4th–3rd c. BC), and, more generally, Allen 1948: 37(1).

10. I wonder if the notion for metric “foot” known in classical tradition as ποδός in Greek and pes in Latin, goes as far back as to this cosmic explanation or is as much on the ground as Martin suggests (“so genannt, weil in alter Zeit der Fuß den Takt des Marschierens angab”, 1974: 324), or if there is something common. West, one of the best experts, would leave the question open. I might argue that the common concept, despite the differences in details, seems to be more convincing. At least for the Graeco–Aryan world, the terminology suggests the existence of a technical language (cf. West 2007: 59–60).
of the world" (Rath 2004: 45). To understand this importance of "voice", one may perhaps have recourse to the logos (λόγος) in the gospel according to John. Since this logos-concept has its roots in the neoplatonic doctrine, Weber (1865: 473) asks himself if Alexandrian neoplatonism – Alexandria being one of the neoplatonic centers – was influenced by the Indian thought. For both vāc and logos, he finds an intermediate stage between the prime matter or principle (Urmatere, Urprinzip) and the personal existence (p. 465) – this could help to understand the rather enigmatic beginning of the gospel –, whereas vāc, and consequently also logos, would be considered also a means during the (cosmogonic) creating act. This reminds of Elizarenkova’s remark that “fixing a name (cf. nāmadhēya) meant creating an object” (1995: 99). Perhaps we understand now the New Testament passage better. But there are passages in the Old Testament too: “The LORD’S word made the heavens, | all the host of heaven was made at his command” (Psalm 33,6), “For he spoke, and it was;” (ib. 9) – cited according to the New English Bible, 1970, p. 635) – the whole complex must be older! Schmidt (1918: 5ff.), who also draws attention to Weber’s discussions in the Indische Forschungen and to Vāc, is rather convincing with what he writes on the Schöpfungsgeschichte (history of creation) and on the “word of God”: “Gott sprach und es ward” (‘God spoke and it came into being’). This is probably an archetypal image for the whole humanity. One only feels corroborated oneself when reading that the IE verbal root *dʰeh₁-, beside ‘put’ etc. meant also ‘speak’. The dictionary of IE verbs explains this in the following manner: the (semantic) coincidence would be

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11. Rath also discusses concepts like “goals” and “Śruti” interpreted as ‘revelation’ (p. 41). The word śruti – originally not more than ‘hearing’, ‘listening’ – is to be connected to the Latin and Greek verbs meaning ‘hear’ (Monier-Williams 2005: 1101; Beekes 2010: 719; śrudhi corresponds to Gk κλύω ‘hear’, ‘listen’, belonging to κλύω ‘hear’, ‘understand’, ‘listen’). For a difference between sābda (a ‘word’ in the mind of the speaker) and śruti (different audible words) cf. Houben (1995: 68). Every further semantic change or nuances in meaning are to be reduced to this semantic base; even śloka-, the familiar metre in versification (cf. KEWA III 372–374, EWAII 666–667, explained: Morgenroth 1977, pp. 216-217(329), belongs, etymologically, here. To Brahman see Williams (2003: 89–90).

12. For the identification of logos and sphota, cf. Sastri 1959: 102–103(1), also 85 ff. and 291 (Index), and Scharfe (1977: 172). For the somewhat strange etymology of the word (‘split’, ‘burst’) cf. KEWA III 543 (s.v. “sphuṭāti”) and EWAIA II 779 (sphot). G.-J. Pinault, the eminent Indo-Europeanist and Sanskritist, in a discussion in the Philologische Bibliothek of the Freie Universität in Berlin (8.09.2013), remarked that sphot is the ‘spoken word’, and – with regard to the etymology – the technical meaning is relatively late, it is not yet there in Vedic. To the concept, see also Houben (1995: 7(12).33.160.236), Iyer (1969: 147 ff., and 588), and Davis (1978: 88–92, and elsewhere).

13. To this, in the Old Testament the following correspond: “τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ πᾶσα ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν” (Psalm 32,6, Rahlfs, Septuaginta II, 1935, p. 31), “οὗτος εἶτεν, καὶ ἔγενήθησαν” (Psalm 32,9, ib.). The difference between the two passage numbers is due to the fact that the Greek text has one psalm more. The English translation is, indeed, not really suitable to render the problems of the present discussion. The words “εἶπεν, καὶ ἔγενήθησαν” are especially significant.
‘stelle hiermit fest’ (=‘I establish’) → ‘verkünden’ (=‘I pronounce’) (LIV 137[1]).

[bedolg.: Δαυίδ: “τὸ ἐπίστευσα, διὸ ἐλάλησα” (loc.: 2 Cor 4,13; Psalm 115 [116],10), cf. φυλλάδιο “Φωνή του Κυρίου”, 25, Σεπτ. 2011 – s.: √ – [conversion of a very ancient concept?] – to comprise on this ground?).

For the theological explanation:

ἐν ἀρχῇ: Präexistenz der Thora. bPes 54 a Bar: “Sieben Dinge wurden geschaffen, bevor die Welt geschaffen wurde, nämlich die Thora, die Buße, der Garten Eden, die Gehenna, der Thron der Herrlichkeit, der Name des Messias.” [etc.] (G. Kittel s.v. λέγω, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, IV, 1942: 139[14].)

[Parallels to the Indic concept] | cf. Prometheus’ “revolt”.
[to comprise in the References] |

It is clear that the concept is ancient and pre-Christian. Beside the aforementioned instances on God and his Word, there are several other other passages from the Bible; one is especially striking: “He (the Son of God) reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3, cited according to RSV, the Revised Standard Version of the English Bible); the parallel with Patañjali, whatever their relation, is striking.

Let’s remark provisionally that two independent traditions seem to have existed of which the oral one must have been more respectable.

[see some lectures of the 2013 IESS]

Monier-Williams cites a pandit’s paper: “We in India believe even at the present day [i.e. before 1899, the 2nd edition of Monier’s lexicon] that oral instruction is far superior to book–learning in maturing the mind and developing its powers” (2005: XXV[1]). Certainly, oral communication, indeed language itself, is much older than the written form of language. It would be worth to investigate if the two traditions were not only completely independent but also mutually exclusive. The Temura case is impressing.

15. Traditionally, the image “Christ Anapeson” (‘the Reclining One’) is identified with Logos (Word), however the respective article by N.P. Ševčenko in The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, vol. 1, 1991: 439, does discuss this belief. If correct, then this is a quite late identification.
Temura (‘Vom Umtausch’ or ‘On Exchange’) is the first tract in the 12th volume of the Babylonian Talmud (the authoritative body of Jewish law and tradition completed in Babylon in the 5th c. A.D.), as edited by L. Goldschmidt. We read here: “Dies besagt dir, daß du mündliche Worte nicht schriftlich vortragen darfst, und schriftliche Worte nicht mündlich vortragen darfst. Ferner wurde [...] gelehrt: Schreibe dir diese Worte auf, diese darfst Du schreiben, du darfst aber keine Halakhoth\textsuperscript{16} schreiben” (Goldschmidt 1996: 44). The Jewish tradition, undoubtedly, is very ancient. Think of Moses, the biblical prophet and law-giver who received the Ten Commandments directly from God. How frequent were such practices (beliefs) world-wide in ancient times?

Script, very probably, evolved from pictograms that must have had a sacred origin. It is well known that Linear B, the language of which was Greek, originated from Minoan Linear A, which, then – according to a theory – was based on a Neolithic system of signs that Gimbutas (1991: 307 ff.) called “Sacred Script”, or more technically, “Old European script” to be put between 5300–4300 B.C. The inventory can be seen on p. 310.\textsuperscript{17}

[Christian teaching has a similar tradition. Orthodox priests in Greece, e.g., contend, still today, that the Scripture consists of texts that came from God. The words used are “ουρανόσταλτος”, “ουρανόπεμπτος”, “θεόσταλτος”, i.e. ‘sent from heaven’, ‘god-sent’.

[an original double tradition: – speech – script]

McEvilley (2002)\textsuperscript{18}

16. I.e. the body of Jewish oral laws supplementing written law or both oral and written law together.
17. The population, and so the language as well, of this system is unknown. In Gimbutas’ interpretation, in any case, pre–IE. They would have been the bearers of a large-scale neolithic culture overridden by the IE expansion. It is not of primary importance that Gimbutas was criticized for her interpretations. The religious aspect is conspicuous. (See also her 1989 book, The Language of the Goddess, pp. 12ff. with the set of signs, where, despite the title, no linguistic considerations are involved).
18. I am indebted to the philosopher Herbert Elbrecht (Frankfurt, Germany) for calling this book to my attention. McEvilley’s comparative study of Greek an Indian thought is insightful, rich and original. However, as a philologist and a linguist, I must express also my disappointment. McEvilley’s discussions of purely linguistic matters are insufficient, sometimes misleading. Moreover, he introduces unfruitful ideology where a classicist or a linguist would not, e.g. on p. XXI ff. With regard to language, and to linguistic issues, a dimension McEvilley also seeks in his book, he is, therefore, to be consulted with caution.

[But also “letters”/script were given by god: cf. “devanāgarī ”, cf. Monier–Williams 2005: XXIII.XXVI; the Kurān is thought to have descended ready written from Heaven (Monier–Williams, ib. XXVI[2]; cf. Moses, Egypt, “sacred script”, Gk tradition?]

According to the Aitareya Upaniṣad, Puruṣa, the primordial giant was hatched from an egg by Ātman, the Self. From the mouth of the giant the speech came out, and from the speech the fire: “de sa bouche (surgit) la parole, et de la parole, le feu” (Ait. Up. I,4; Silburn 1950: 28). The Puruṣa–hymn (RV X 90, the Puruṣasūkta) is not as explicit as that, however the birth of the brahmans is assigned to his mouth, and, also the four castes (the three others being rājanyā, váisyā, śūdrā) are nowhere so clearly explained as here (Michel 2008: 288 to 12). Whereas the Puruṣa–hymn is rather late (Michel 2008: 286), it is generally agreed that the Upaniṣad text belongs to the oldest ones of its kind (see e.g. Silburn 1950: 18.20).

Also, as to classical scholarship, I would not maintain that he is characterized by a philological prowess.

19. Cf. the German translation by Deussen (Michel 2007: 51): “spaltete sich sein Mund wie ein Ei, aus dem Munde entsprang die Rede, aus der Rede Agni;”(see also the commentary on p. 48). II,4 depicts the reverse course: “Alors le feu devenu parole entra dans la bouche” etc. (ib., p. 29). In German: “Agni als Rede in seinen Mund einging” etc. (Michel 2007: 52). The Ait.Up. is a kind of commentary to RV 10,90, the hymn about Puruṣa, the Primordial Man. Paragraphs 9–14 of the hymn describe his parts that correspond to the parts and elements of Nature but the description is not as explicit as in the Ait. Up. (cf. Michel 2008: 286–288).

20. For the original see Aufrecht 1968 II: 388,12. The etymology of the name Puruṣa (pū– + vṛṣa– ‘bull’, cf. Adams – Mallory 1997a: 138) explains why he was sacrificed. It has been suggested that the primeval myth of the PIE community involved the sacrifice of both a human and a bovine (ox or cow). pū– and vṛṣa– were combined into a single name. See also Mallory’s article “Stelae” in the same encyclopedia (pp. 544–546), and the Puruṣa–interpretation on p. 544.

21. The relationship of Puruṣa, Prajāpati (‘the Lord of Beings’), and the RV passage is perhaps best explained by Basham. According to him, there is no clearly defined creator–god in the RV. By the end of the RV period, however, such a god had developed: Prajāpati, later called Brahmā, the masculine form of the neuter brahman. He was thought of as a primeval man (puruṣa), who existed before the foundation of the universe. The man was sacrificed, presumably to himself, by the gods, who apparently were his children. (Cf. to this: in the Edda the god Wodan, in order to obtain magic power, is sacrificed by himself to himself). From the body of the divine victim the universe was produced. The great Hymn of the Primeval Man, as Basham expresses himself, “bristles with obscurity, but its purport is quite clear” (1954: 240). Cf. to all this the chapter “The solitary Twin” by West (2007: 356–359), where Puruṣa’s sacrifice is discussed in the broader Indo–European context of
The Cosmogonic Myth that may be reconstructed on the base of these texts and other concepts, is that the (primeval) ‘man’ (Puruṣa) was divided so that his anatomy became the source of the physical world (e.g. his breath became the wind), and the underlying structure is also reversible, i.e. it also yields an anthropogenic myth where the various part of the human body are made from the elements of the foregoing process. So, wind becomes the breath of the primeval ‘man’, etc. Logically, the head is the source of the priesthood and is the seat of thought, perception and speech and so on (Mallory 1997: 129).


McEvilley 2002, 26–27:

As a parallel to this, cf. Epicur. Epist. Her. ( ) [to work up]

3. Stoīkeia and letters

D.L. Proem. 319-20: “he [i.e. the Athenian Musaeus, son of Eumolpus] maintained that all things proceed from unity and are resolved again in unity”.22 [+McEvilley 2002: 300 ff.]

cosmogonic myth. The legend of Romulus and Remus, structurally, might be the same motive. Prajāpāti’s (the very first of the Gods) gradual rise and many entities from the Highest Being to the sacrifice may shed some light on the Indian concept on language: among many others he became mind or spirit (manas) and sacred speech (vāc, the Vedic Mantras). Having become speech he was equal to all (Gonda 1986: 117; see also 175–176). 22. φάναι τε ἔξ ἕνος τά | πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς ταύτων ἀναλύεσθαι (Greek text according to the edition by M. Marcovich, Teubner 1999 Vol. I, p. 6). English rendering according to the translation by R.D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius, I, Loeb 1925, p. 5. For more details (original text, Italian translation, some remarks), cf. Reale 2005: 10.11.1307. Also: McEvilley (2002, p. 27), according to whom the concept that “All things are born from the One and all things are resolved back into it” was the central Orphic doctrine. In a larger sense, this approach was, he adds, a manifestation of monism, of the metaphysical view that there is only one ultimate reality, as contrasted with pluralism, and to which, in religion and mythology, the macranthropy corresponds. For a similar view in Anaximander, see McEvilley 2002: 31. (The concept of macranthropy, i.e. the concept that the universe is a living human like being, a “Cosmic Person”, derives ultimately from either Babylonia or from Egypt – both of them being a convenient intermediate source for Greece and India in their shared intellectual experiences, otherwise difficult to explain, [cf. McEvilley 2002: 24.26.59] – but the term “Macranthropus” seems to have been coined by Paracelsus
4. Name–giving [for “name” – see also EIEC]

On the evidence of Indic, mainly the Rig Veda, the names are "made" and then "put" on the object which is often a child. This is reflected e.g. in Sanskrit nāma dhā-, nāmadhēya: [cf. H. Grassmann, Wb. zum RV, 1964 – sheet, loci: 897,1 908,3 (according to Aufrecht) (Grassmann: 827 – 1017 = 10,1 – 10191). This fundamental operation with names is discussed by Elizarenkova who renders the phrase with ‘put/set/fixed a name’. She gives contexts according to which the operation acquires a cosmogonic value since “fixing a name meant a creating an object”! Quoting Renou, she also remarks the intimate semantic ties between nāman and dhāman–, the last deriving from the root dhā–. West, too, underlines that “put” both means ‘set in place’ and ‘create’ (2007: 28). Renou sees here in the first “the global and abstract aspect of the same notion whose multiple and accidental side is represented” by the second (1995: 99–100). I would add that, again, this is also a play on words. Several other remarks by Elizarenkova can be be read on the following pages.23 nāmadhēya: ‘a name’, ‘title’; ‘the ceremony of giving a name to a child’ Monier-Williams 2005: 536, citing Mn. II, 123.

[Prēūmā: in name giving – Pl. Cra. 402 b, 411 c (cf. Méridier 1931:]


[1493–1541] or by the philosophers of science preceding him). For Zeus as a Cosmic Person, cf. the Orphic hymn OF 168 (Kern), and McEvilley 2002: 27–28.
23. With regard to “put”, one is inclined to recognize the same underlying concept when meeting Greek phrases like ‘to put a fate’ μοιράν ἐπιτιθέναι, cf. Onians 1951: 378 ff.
25. “Bṛhaspate prathamāṃ vācā āgrāṃ yāt prāirāta nāmadhēyaṃ dādhānāḥ” (RV X 71,1
Manu's Laws: “In the beginning he [i.e. Lord, the Creator of the Universe] made the individual names and individual innate activities and individual conditions of all things precisely in accordance with the words of the Veda”; “To people who do not understand the greeting when a name is given […]” (Mn. I 21 and II 123, italicising ours).²⁶

The name "Odysseus" given by Autolykos:
“Autolykos, find yourself a name now to give to your child's own child; be sure he has long been prayed for.”²⁷ | Then Autolykos answered her, and said: “My daughter's husband and my daughter, give him the name I shall tell you. Inasmuch as I have come here as one that has willed pain to many, both men and women, over the fruitful earth, therefore let the name by which the child is named be Odysseus [...].”²⁸

On the role of the knees have written formerly, among others, Benveniste, Cahen and Meillet. The first (1927) interprets Irish, Soghdian and other expressions which contain the word “knee” in similar contexts and concludes that putting a child on the knees of the father equalled with his acknowledgement as a legal heir; Meillet's remarks (1927) on Latin genuinus, Greek γνήσιος (both ‘authentic’) with additional data

²⁶ Cf. to the Vedic tradition, Monier–Williams (2005: 536). Olivelle translates the passages using other words but the two renderings are essentially the same (2005: 88 and 101). I have not found remarks either in Wendy Doniger or in Olivelle commenting on the present issue, whereas Bühler remarks to II 123: "I.e. to those who either are unacquainted with grammar or with the Dharmasāstra [...]" (1886: 52[123]).

²⁷ As the Murray – Dimock edition remarks (1995: 269), Eurycleia's “long prayed for” (πολυάρητος) was itself a not uncommon Greek name, Polyaretus. And Autolykos' own name suggests "wolfish" (‘wolf’, again, not infrequent in names!).

²⁸ "Αὐτόλυκ’, αὐτὸς γὰρ ὅνομ᾽ εὕρεο ὅττι ἐκ θησαυροῦ παρεδόθη πολυάρητος δὲ τοῖς ἐπηνυστιν." | Τών δ’ αὐτόν Ἀὐτόλυκος ἀπαμείβετο φιόνησθαι τε- (405) | «Γαμβρός ἔμοι θυγάτηρ τε, τίθεσθ’ ὅνομ’ ὅτι κεν ἐπιμετοχῇ συναντήσας γὰρ ἐγὼ γε ὀδύσσαμένοι τὸ úκανόν, ἰδού γὰρ γναίνεις ἀνὰ χθόνα πουλυβοτείραν· τῷ δ’ Ὁδυσσεύς ὅνομ’ ἐστιν ἐπιώνυμον [...]."

corroborates the above observations, and so does Cahen (1927) adding several Germanic details.

LIV (2001)

To the Odyssey passage, cf. the conservative Russian koleno (колено), meaning, still today, both ‘knee’ and ‘generation’, with the derivative pokolenie (поколение) ‘generation’. The important thing is not only that the word is akin to Greek γόνυ and γένος, and to Latin genus and Latvian koleno (kolenos, ‘generation’, ‘knee’). The latter, as a barbarism, for a long time, was not resolvable for all these will be the – understandably – ‘to turn [around]’, but the role of the knee in name-giving (cf. Trubatchev 1977: 44–45 where he has the root *kel– for which he puts, among others, rise’, ‘grow’, for the related ēlen [член] etc. ‘member of a family’, and, Id. 1983: 132–134, for koleno and pokolenie, where he has *kel– and *kelh– meaning ‘turn around’, and figuratively, ‘come into being’, ‘grow’ etc.). To all this, we may add that words for the ‘knee’ were often used euphemistically for the genitals (Adams 1997: 33, Mallory 1997: 129). Then, we may understand Doroszewski’s suggestion that *kel-no-s meant ‘anything arising’, ‘appearing’, ‘bubbling forth’ (“что-либо выступающее”, Trubatchev 1977: 45).²⁹

5. Passages, views. [v. et infra!]

– 5.1 [etc.] Dionysius Halicarnassensis (Halicarnaseus) (D.H., 1st c. B.C.):

“There are in human and articulate speech a number of first- | beginnings admitting no further division which we call elements and letters: «letters» (γράμματα) because they are denoted by certain lines (γραμμαί) and «elements» (στοιχεία) because every sound made by the voice originates in these,³⁰ as is ultimately resolvable into them” (Translation by Rhys Roberts 1910: pp. 137 and 139).³¹

²⁹. For precision: LIV does not identify the two roots *kel– and *kelh–, and has, for the first, *kel–¹ (‘antreiben’, p. 348), and for the second, *kelh–¹ (‘eine Drehung machen, sich umdrehen, sich [um–, zu–]wenden’, p. 386). The semantics, however, as to our purpose, does not differ significantly.

³⁰. In a passage in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (II, 1,1), the hedonist Aristippos’ answer to Socrates shows that ἄρχη (beginning) and στοιχείον, by that time, were synonymous. Cf. also Burkert 1959, e.g. p. 176(1).

³¹. “Αρχαὶ μὲν οὖν ἑστὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φωνῆς καὶ | ἐνάρθρως μηκέτι δεχόμενα διαίρεσιν, ἅ καλούμεν | στοιχεία καὶ γράμματα· γράμματα μὲν ὁτι γραμμαῖς | τις σημαίνεται, στοιχεία δὲ ὅτι πάσα φωνῆ τὴν γε– | νεσίν ἐκ τούτων λαμβάνει πρώτων καὶ
- **Plato** (427–347 B.C.):

  “Surely, my meaning, Protarchus, is made clear | in the letters of the alphabet, which you were taught as a child; so learn it from them. [...] Sound which passes through the mouth of each and all of us, is one, and yet again it is infinite in number” (Phlb. 17A–B).\(^{32}\)

  In this passage, mentioning school practice, Plato informs us, that *letters have sounds* even though the aim of the dialogue is other than giving that information. His thoughts are similar in the *Sophist* where he argues that *grammar serves to combine letters* whereas the same job is done with *sounds in music* (Pl. Soph. 253A).

  “Let us again make use of letters to explain what this means. [...] The way some god or god-inspired man discovered that vocal sound is unlimited, as tradition in Egypt claims for a certain deity called Theuth. He was the first to discover that the vowels in that unlimited variety are not one but several [...] until he had found out the number for each one of them, and then he gave all of them together the name «letter» [...] considered that the one link that somehow unifies them all and called it the art of literacy” (Phlb. 188–D; translation by Dorothea Frede, in: Cooper – Hutchinson 1997: 406; omissions by the present author).\(^{33}\)

  *Cratylus*: 397 b c ← 426 a b (Méridier 1931: 29)

  Theuth (Thoth) was the Egyptian Hermes. Plato may have thought that the cradle of civilization was once in Egypt. Hermes was, in the Graeco–Roman world (*Mercurius* in Latin) the *epitermios* divinity, the great *mediator*
between *anything*, and so between the gods and humans, too. He is also referred to as the interpreter or devisor of speech.\(^{34}\) Theuth's contribution was, in this interpretation, *discovering* the script. Script, too, was considered *sacred* and had, consequently, also a god (Frede 1997: 150–151).\(^{35}\) To Frede's discussion we add that the first concept seems – beyond what she explains – to be more practical, the second more philosophical. There have been attempts both by grammarians and modern scholars to trace a semantic difference yet, in the work of the most important authors, the two terms are synonymous in grammar, and the difference, if any, certainly is not *that* between 'sound' and 'letter' (Burkert 1959: 169.173). One can ask oneself how old the philosophical implications were. [To this: Rhys Roberts 1910: 43.46.136 + D.H. Comp. XIV, ἄρχαί ...]

- [W. Burkert, ΣΤΟΙΧΕΙΟΝ 1959; H. Diels, Elementum 1899, Beekes 2010: 1396]

Στοιχεῖον: "Εργαστηρίον der Reihe", "Glied eines Systems", "Mittel, ein System zu ergänzen", "eine bestimmte Form wissenschaftlicher Darstellung überhaupt"; Ευκλειδς, Στοιχεῖα – "für den Mathematiker sind also die Sätze στοιχεῖα, die er zu seinen Beweisen braucht, von denen er in seinen Spezialuntersuchungen ausgehen kann" (Burkert 1959: 189), "Glied, das zur Reihe ergänzt" (Burkert ib. 192), "Ergänzungen zum System, Στοιχεῖα" (id. ib. 195).

The stoikheion–problem, despite the numerous attempts at its interpretation, cannot be regarded as solved (cf. Beekes 2010: 1396). What I would argue is that *order* or the *ordered* nature of things with this word seems to be assured. The *stoikheia*, then, might be the resultants of an ancient generalizing mental operation, and, accordingly, their limits may lie along the borders of early philosophical thinking, or better even, politico–ideological thinking, which relies on, and partly is identical with, philosophical interpretations. The importance of *order*, repeatedly recognized, is perhaps best realized by Benveniste who discusses it under the concept of *thémis* and gives it the distinctive indication of "extremely important". "We have here one of the cardinal notions of the legal world of

\(^{34}\) To this, cf. the interesting discussion by Diez de Velasco (1993, e.g. pp. 22–23). To the devisor of speech cf. Allen (1948: 37[4]).

\(^{35}\) For Indic and other parallels cf. Thumb – Hauschild. The name of the devanāgarī script is traditionally considered to mean "the script of the city of the gods [= of Sky]" (1958: 188–189), and even the Brāhma script (Brāhmī lipī) that preceded devanāgarī was considered as invented by the God Brahmā (Monier – Williams 2005: XXVI). Plato repeats Theuth’s achievements in his Phaedrus. (To this, cf. Chr. Moore 2012 [to work up!]. Th. was, further, regarded, among others, as the founder of astronomy and mathematics (cf. 274 b–c). It is striking, that the Devanāgarī script, which succeeded Brāhmī lipī, was created – according to a relatively late construct – by Sarasvatī, the wife of Brahmā (cf. Basham 1954: 316).
the Indo–European to say nothing of their religious and moral ideas: this is
the concept or ‘Order’ which governs also the orderliness of the universe,
the movement of the stars, the regularity of the seasons and | the years;
and further the relations of gods and men, and finally the relations of men
to one another. Nothing which concerns man or the world, falls outside the
realm or ‘Order’. It is thus the foundation, both religious and moral, of
every society. Without this principle everything would revert to
chaos” (1969: 379–380). Stoikheia as letters would not go back to IE level;
Benveniste does not discuss them but the limit, if we consider the concept
that language and script came from the divine sphere, may hardly have
been emerging literacy. He then enumerates a number of related words with
Greek ἀραρίσκω, and Latin ars among them. We find r, ta, naturally, in
the first place. To be added that Latin ars meant originally ‘natural disposition’,
‘qualification’, and ‘talent’ (ib.). He then concludes writing “Everywhere the
same notion is still perceptible: order, arrangement, the close mutual
adaptation of the part of a whole to one another, even though the
derivatives have undergone different semantic specialization in the different
languages. We thus have for Indo–European a general concept which
embraces, by numerous lexical variants, the religious, legal, and technical
aspects of ‘order’. But within each domain distinctive terms were found
necessary. This is why ‘law’ was given more precise expressions which must
be studied each in their proper sphere.”36 The explanation for the
doubleness of stoikheia – grammata (‘letters’), I might argue, can be sought
in the duality “order” postulates according to Benveniste and the ideological,
later, philosophical thinking. Polomé, who postulates an IE *h,értus,
remarks: “the underlying meaning would appear to be ‘fitting’ which had
already developed metaphysical connotations in Indo–Iranian ‘cosmic order,
fitting in time and space’, i.e. cosmos must be kept in harmony by rituals
and sacrifices which adjust the relationships between the microcosm and
the macrocosm. Such an underlying concept may have already existed
within PIE” (1997c). More a case for India, yet, perhaps, not unrelated, in
charge of r, tā– stand Mitrā (the dual form for ‘Mitra and the other one’) or

36. Cf. McEvilley 2002: 24 (on the concern with “universal order” and “unifying principles
behind apparent diversity”), Mahony 1995: 480–1 (on “cosmic order”, with an incorrect
etymological explanation of “rta”, and on “cosmic harmony”, cf. RV 1.105.12 [check! – ?]),
and Adams 1997a: 362 on tām (‘fixed rule, divine law; sacred or pious action’) whereas the
stem r, tā– means ‘afflicted with; right, proper’. On the meaning, see also Miller 1985:
38–47. The concept both contains a dynamic and a static side that are not always equally
stressed with their three connotations: activity – order – law. Since grammatically the word
is a participium perfectum, the best interpretation is perhaps “something gone over
correctly” or “the settled or ordered course of going”. The structure of the universe is
rendered by this many faceted concept which comprises all possible levels: natural, socio–
ethical, and religio–sacrificial (Miller ib.). The word itself, of course, is to be reduced to
*her–, and is cognate with Greek ἀρμός, ἀραρίσκω, ἀρμονία, etc.
as a *devata dvandva*37 Mitra–Varuna. It is Varuna properly, who is charged
with the maintenance of the forces of cosmos (Adams–Mallory 1997b).

[to work up: McCone, ‘King’ and ‘Queen’ 1998, p. 9, rtá– ‘Weltordnung’ etc.
– √]

Philosophical approaches, indeed, were often undertaken. Beekes (ib.)
also remarks that the singular is secondary. We could think of an
interchange of more concrete and more abstract meanings. Once *language,*
*letters,* *speech,* *sounds,* etc. were supposed to have to do in whichever way
with the divine sphere (cf. McEvilley 2002: 58!), assuming a constant
recurring movement between the earthly and the divine worlds is not
impossible. It is typical that whereas grammarians like [... – check!, DH;
Katonis 2010: ] write that the elements are the first beginnings and the
ultimate goal into which everything dissolves [...] meaning *letters,* the same
is said in philosophy. This is maintained e.g. in Stephanus’ lexicon: “proprie
de quatuor mundi elementis et principiis, ex quibus omnia oriuntur et
prodeunt” (TGL VIII: 789, s.v. *Στοιχείον*). With regard to the grammarians,
the lexicon is not as detailed as it should be but clearly, *Στοιχεία,* *elementa,*
are regarded more abstract and more general (ib. cc. 790–791). The lexicon
deals with the word and its derivatives in nine columns (788–796). Similarly,
the Suida–lexicon writes both about “τάξις” (‘order’) and the four elements
in a philosophical sense (s.vv. *Στοιχείον* and *Στοιχος* respectively, Suid. IV,
Adler 1935, p. 446; see p. 435 on *στίχος,* *Στοιχος* being ‘τάξις’ and *στίχος*
being both ‘τάξις’ and ‘line’). EM (728-791), again, writes on τάξις in a
military context (s.v. *Στιχάει*). What Indian thinkers offer is often
comparable to, and also criticizable in similar manner, with Greek
grammatical approaches. What would interest a linguist, often and largely
gets lost, or to use a term inspired by the texts themselves, “dissolves in
philosophical considerations”. Sastri’s book (1959), promising by its title, is
written in a somewhat inflated language, presupposes, to be sure, the
knowledge of Indian thought, but the only important thing to learn is that
the language issue is of paramount importance. Word or Speech is shown as
the “eternal” and “absolute” principle (cf. e.g. p. 24), i.e. it precedes
creation, but one is not really instructed on either physiological aspects or
on – so that we paraphrase John 1.14 – how the λόγος σάρξ ἔγενετο (how
‘the Word became flesh’). One concept, however, may convey us further: the
atomic constitution in the Jaina system of thought. Unlike some other
approaches, they assume that word or sound are possessed of tactile
properties like other material substances (Sastri 1959: 52–53). [p. 52:

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37. Devata dvamda, a compound whose members are two (or more) members of deities
(Monier–Williams 2005: 495).
“sound-atoms”, may be important! check!, “atomic constitution” referred to by Bhartṛhari–check! Houben, Iyer!]

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One more detail, however, seems still more important in advancing the interpretations: Tarn Steiner 1994, p. 122, γράμματα≠στοιχεία! ... Atomist equation between letters and atomic matter ... (ib. fn. 91) [cf. in India: (Sastri 1959: 52–53). [p. 52: “sound–atoms”].

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For more details on the respective verb in IE languages cf. the special dictionary LIV 593–594. The repeating semantics is always an upward movement: ‘to come up’, ‘to rise” – a fact that may need further consideration.

Authors:

- A.D. Comp. I (Lallot, Notes, p. 9)
  - K. Gaiser
  - H. Diels
  - Beekes (etym).
- Ph. Brandenburg:

What Brandenburg adds to the stoikheia–problem is that this concept is, in his opinion, “meronomic” (meronomisch, from the Greek word meros, ‘part’) as opposed to “taxonomic”. He then explains the word with the linguistic term “syntagmatic”, i.e. conceived in a sequential dimension as opposed to “paradigmatic” (a synonym for “taxonomic”). One may think of the Greek word for the “parts of speech” (μέρη τοῦ λόγου). This would explain that stoikheion did not mean only the ‘letters’ although he admits, resigning on any etymological attempt, that in grammar, stoikheion and gramma, both, arrived at becoming termini technici for “letter” (2005: 48.58.59.60).

- Aristotle (384–322 B.C.):
“Thus it is very difficult to say, not only what view we should adopt in the foregoing questions in order to arrive at the truth, but also in the case of the first principles [...] whether we should assume that the genera, or the simplest constituents of each particular thing, are more truly the elements and first principles of existing things. E.g., it is generally agreed that the elements and the first principles of speech are those things of which, in their simplest form, all speech is composed; and not the common term “speech”; and in the case of geometrical propositions we call those the “elements” [...] whose proofs are embodied in the proofs of all or most of the rest. Again, in the case of bodies, both those [2] who hold that there are several elements and those who hold that there is one call the things of which bodies are composed and constituted first principles” (Aristotle The Metaphysics, With an English translation by H. Tredennick, LCL, 1961, pp. 116–117).

To this passage, cf. Burkert (1959: 190) who finds important the fact that the text shows στοιχεῖον as attested in mathematics.

[To this: Diss. 38 – Diog. Laert. on Leukippus! – to comprise?]

- Apollonius Dyscolus Grammaticus (A.D., 2nd c.): [below?]

(De Constr. I 2)

Etymologically, γράμμα goes back to a root meaning to ‘designate, indicate’ (cf. German Kerbe, kerben), and στοιχεῖον to στείχω, secondarily στοιχέω (‘step, proceed’, cf. German Steg, steigen). But as soon as we are able to learn in tradition more about Ancient Greek education, the cosmic implications appear. The Platonic passage may be conceived as holding that the letters of the alphabet are the most primitive and the most common element of bodies and speech. The etymology of the term “cosmic” is thus derived from the Greek στοιχεῖον, which means “element” or “constituent”, and from the Latin cosmos, meaning “world” or “universe.”

38. “Περὶ τῶν τούτων οὖν ἀπορία πολλῆ πώς ἔχει μόνον ταῦτα τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄρχων πόσερνοι δὲ τὰ γένη στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄρχας ὑπολογισμάτων ἢ μάλλον ἔχει ἣν ἐνυπαρχόντων ἐστὶν ἀκαστὸν πρῶτων [...] ὡς φωνῆς στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄρχας δοκοῦσθαι εἶναι ταῦτα ἔχει ἣν σύγκειται διὰ φωνῆς πάσαι πρῶτων, ἄλλα τὸ κοινὸν ἢ φωνή· καὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων ταῦτα στοιχεῖα λέγομεν, ἣν αἱ ἀποδείξεις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν ταῖς τῶν ἀλλων [...]. ἀποδείξεις ἢ πάντων ἢ πλείστων. ἔτι δὲ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἥ πλείω λέγοντες εἶναι στοιχεῖα καὶ ἔν, ἔχει ἣν σύγκειται καὶ ἔχει ἣν συνεστηκέν ἀρχας λέγουσιν εἶναι” (Met. 998a 20–30).

39. Cf. Burkert 1959: 168. For the etymologies, cf. e.g. DELG 235–236.1049, and Beekes 2010: 1396. Although ultimately the two groups go back to concepts like ‘scratch, cut, carve’, and ‘step (up), climb’ respectively (cf. also EIEC 143.228.488), there might be something more behind what DELG and Marrou (1950: 210) hint at in this connexion. As a minimum, one should refer to the fact that the letters were first taught orally, and that the “cosmic” symbolism (music and numbers included) was there from the first moment. Is it a mere coincidence when Weber (1876: 27), writing on šiksā, “Lautlehre”, “Metrik” and “astronomische Berechnungen” (phonetics, metrics and astronomical calculations) connects
understanding Theuth’s contribution containing a structured classification system of sounds and corresponding letters (Frede 1997: 154–155) just as the pupils were supposed to learn an “ordered set of elements”. The word στείχω has its relatives in Ancient Indian (cf. KEWA III 514–515, EWAiA II 761, and Monnier–Williams 2005: 1258) but more implications than the military ones do not seem to be present. Sanskrit stemh– means ‘to step (up)’, ‘to stride’, ‘to ascend’ etc. Would the military dimension be a mark where we can look for as an appropriate semantic link? Or, is it as down-to-earth a concept as a hunting term (“jägersprachlich”) – according to Knobloch (EWAiA II 761)? Or, what we would prefer, as sublime as the verbal semantics of Old Church Slavonian po–stignọ, actual Russian постигнуть, ‘to reach’, ‘to meet’ (cf. KEWA III 514)? The semantics of Russian “постигнуть мысль” (‘to grasp the meaning of something’) might be thought–provoking.40

What do “ἐπεφθέγξατο” and “προσεπτών” mean exactly?41 A detailed etymological and semantic analysis may, perhaps, be dispensed with but both of them definitely give the impression of a ceremomialism. The second, akin to epos (ἔπος), is widespread and old in Indo–European (IE). Εἶτον (‘l they said’) corresponds to Skt. ávocam (‘I spoke’), and έπος to vácas (‘speech’, cf. Adams – Mallory 1997: 535). Perhaps, the use of an ancient element, with the verbal prefix προς– (‘to’) is not improper in the given context. The first verb, the etymology of which is problematic, akin to φθόγγος and other derivatives which are widely used in grammatical

with one another?

40. We will definitely disagree with either as a correct analysis of the important mediae /β δ χ/ stating them as “tonlose” under “stimmlose” (!) or as Frede’s result interpreting Theut’s contribution (of course, in Plato’s presentation, ib. p. 154). Frede gives a list of “mittlere” (=’mediae’) with question mark as “stimmhaft” (=’voiced’) without question mark but containing letters like /σ θ χ/, and others. The ancients, with the exception of the Indians, did not realize voice normally, even European tradition was late to discover it (Allen 1987: 28.30; cf. Allen 1953: 33ff.). There is no point in checking if Frede interpreted Theuth correctly. Her (their?) system is confused and unsuitable for a linguistic analysis, and should not be reckoned with. More important are there the general remarks.


42. There could exist a stem φθευ– with regular ablaut and nasalization, as Beekes (2010: 1569) remarks but the IE connections are not certain. Plato uses the verb φθεγγομαι, e.g. in the Laws VII (800a and c. as “φθεγγέσθω” and “φθέγγοστο”), in two similar contexts. The first is rendered by R.G. Bury in the Loeb edition (1926) as ‘shall utter’, the second rendering uses the word ‘voice’ as subject to the verb ‘bring upon’. [ib.: “ἀττοπον”, “μη καταγέλαστος” – komm.]. In Book II (664a), it is the lawgiver (νομοθέτης, 663e) who must ensure that the whole community uses always the same language, and the verb for this is, again, “φθέγγοστο”. Is this the language spoken, the opinion (as Schöpsdau 1994: 50 suggests) or both? If the latter, the existence of the couple νομοθέτης/νομοθέτης seems to be more justified. One could ask oneself perhaps two more important questions to which I do not venture an answer here: why is this verb deponent (the middle voice expresses always something subjective) ?, and how to evaluate the fact that the verb is
contexts, plead, in our feeling, for a teleology, something not infrequent in antique literary tradition. Προσφωνέω or προσαγορεύω, the lexical entries for προσεῖπον, mean, indeed ‘utter after’, ‘utter in accordance’, ‘utter in connexion with’, and similar. Can we assume that, even if “ὄνοματοθέτης”/”νομοθέτης“ are somewhat unhappily attested in Greek when compared with Latin and Sanskrit, the same “governing” concept was underlying? Ultimately, the word corroborates the assumption that these were contents “communicated” from a space above the human sphere. 43 Diehl argues that φθέγγεσθαι, φθογγή, φθόγγος “retain their basic meaning as «sound» and «language»” (1940: 93).

The φύσει – θέσει problem: (Lat. naturā – positū, Sanskrit nityatvāt (“by permanence”, i.e. ‘by inherent connection’) – sāmayikāt (“by convention”).

The basis for this belief: [v. supra]

– Lejeune on the origin of the alphabet (“letters”) 45

possibly non–IE? The etymological dictionaries are cautious, some connections with Slavic and Lithuanian forms have been considered but are uncertain, and the LIV does not list it. The best, one can suggest is a consideration – more persuasive semantically than phonologically – which connects the concepts of “shine, glow, glitter, glimmer, twinkle; ring, (re)sound, (re)echo, resonate, linger in one’s mind/memory” (cf. GEW II 1012 s.v. φθέγγομαι) and LIV 512 (s.v. ?*[s]b‘eng–). To such unexpected couples, the case of Greek ἀργός (“shining’, white’, glistening’; ‘swift–footed’) could be reminded where the semantics has been established satisfactorily. (The adjective is not to be confused with ἀργὸς ‘idle’, ‘lazy’, where the α is long).

43. Des Places gives a survey of “νόμος”, “νομοθέτης” and “ὄνοματοθέτης” in Plato and suggests a partial synonymy. It is especially transparent that “νομοθέτης” equals “ὄνοματοθέτης” in Cra. 389a5, because the preceding passage (389a2) has “ὄνοματουργός” translated as “name–maker” by H.N. Fowler in the Loeb edition (cf. des Places 1964: 363 and 384). Also, in the familiar φύσει–θέσει dilemma – the main concern of Plato’s Cratylus –, “νόμος” may replace “θέσει” (des Places ib., p. 363). Could then “νόμος” equal ‘law’, ‘language’ and ‘tune? Cf. Astius ([1836], II, 1956: 390–392.453) for a similar presentation of the same terms used by Plato. A further support can be extracted from Polomé – Mallory (1997[a]: 245) where the root dhēh– is discussed under “Law” (cf. Gk θῆςις, θέμις, Lat. con–diti–δ, Skt. –dhiti–, German Tat, English deed etc. To Sanskrit dhiiti– ‘Schicht’, ‘Lage’, cf. EWAI A I 784, s.v. dha. Thus, the root means ‘to set’, ‘to establish’, and what is, then, “set”, “established”, is law. The distribution indicates PIE status, as does also with “name” (to which see p. 390).

44. As Allen (1948: 38–37) remarks, the English translation of θέσις by ‘convention’ is not accurate; it represents only one aspect of θέσις, that which Aristotle calls συνθήκη, ‘a joint agreement made by a number of people’, whereas θέσις admits the possibility of a system arbitrarily made by one man and subsequently imposed upon his fellows. More accurate equivalent would be “invention”. This is an important point for our investigation to think about, and also that Aristotle was the most eminent supporter of the θέσις–theory.

45. It will be easy to understand this concept in Korea: the Korean alphabet (the “letters”) were created by King Sejong (1418–1450), i.e. by a well–known person in historical times. He directed scholars for this task and the alphabet is called Hangeul (Kim 2007: 39). [+cirill
On sait qu’Homère a caché dans la langue des dieux l’alphabet, et avec lui les noms des lettres, par anagrammes [...] (Bader 2012: 24) – [to work up!]


b, γράμματα

[Cra.–loci – v. infra]

[see also above!] Although the Platonic dialogue Cratylus is dedicated to linguistic issues\(^\text{46}\) it is not clear with regard either to linguistic origins or phonetics. Through its hints we infer however, that such ideas were largely current.\(^\text{47}\) The relatively rare attestations of such entities in Greek [see LSJ data!] may point to the fact, as the Cratylus experience also shows, that they were both frequent and found problematic.\(^\text{48}\) Polomé and Mallory give

\[||\text{Lejeune, Katonis 2010: 52[184]). No need to say that the reconstructed form of the word ὄνομα, nömê etc. ("h:neh:mn) gives the impression that the form must be a compound. Indeed, the root can be conceived as "h:neh:--, and this must have meant 'to sue, to judge', preserved in Hittite ḫanna– (Beekes 2010: 1085). To the use of the Hittite verb cf. Hoffner – Melchert 2008, 1: 233.234(14.11), there: 'to litigate, judge', and active ḫi–verb in New Hittite – without reference to the compound noun). The verb is being discussed in the frame of Medio–Passive Stem Formation. The conceptual sphere of ‘law’, ‘law–giver’ – ‘name’, ‘name–giver’ is now, I think, clearer.\[\]

46. It has often been noted that the ancients did not take a real interest in linguistic issues. The dialogue Cratylus may not be an exception: Méridier (1931: 30) thinks – following Diès and others – that “the dialogue is, first of all, an essay of epistemology”, and that “the linguistic study”, presented there, “is a pretext”. Our information on language issues given by the ancients will always be fragmentary, and we must make the best with what we can do using various details given for other than linguistic purposes, or, by chance. (Cf. to this Katonis 2010 [l]: 54, although, as it seems to me now, the opinion of Baratin – Desbordes [1981] can be further developed in the recent survey).

47. Cf. e.g. Frede 1997: 149. She explains the causes of succinctness – plausibly in our opinion – with schooling than must have been familiar to the discussants.

48. One would expect Watkins to give a detailed discussion but this is not the case. He remarks however: “The mystical importance of the ‘name’ is itself probably a universal” (1995: 224). Since this is not the main concern of this paper it may be enough to refer to Blümel (1912/13: 21 ff.) for some explanations, and to Hahn (1969) who dedicates a chapter to Greek. Yet, for “to give a name”, Latin is more explicit: “nomen [...] indo/ indunt” (pp. 13.101.103+, where also Greek examples). Greek ὄνομα θέσθαι, ‘to put a
no passage to this word although the IE parallels like Skt náma dhā– are clear (1997[b]: 390).

A relatively easily understood case would be the Platonian Charmides passage:

"[we ...] cannot discover what | thing it can possibly be to which a lawgiver gave this name’ ([they talk about “σωφροσύνη”, ‘temperance’], 175B, W.R.M. Lamb, LCL, 1972, pp. 85–87). “νομοθέτης” (‘lawgiver’) can be corrected to “ὄνοματοθέτης” (‘name–giver’) without difficulty but even if we do not do this the case remains the same: if a name was given giving was meant as official and compulsory. (p. 11v: νέμω, νόμος etc.) – double entendre? – cf. peer-review paper from Pusan + Herbert’s remarks: Pythagoras [Terpandros? – both from Samos!]; “nomos”: a, ‘law’, b, ‘tune’, ‘melody’, c, ‘name’ [onom]? – “nomothetes” = ‘lawgiver’; ‘composer’; ‘name–giver’?"

With regard to the Plato passage, the Budé edition does not hesitate: we read the form “ὄνοματοθέτης”. The translation, again, relies on the “νομοθέτης” issue: ‘le législateur du langage a donné ce nom de sagesse’. With regard to the somewhat uncertain tradition about “ὄνοματοθέτης” vs. “νομοθέτης” (was there a popular double entendre, ὅνομα – νομοθέτης?), we may cite Benveniste who underlined the strong connection with everything that had a regulating content originating in common law. He examines forms like "νέμεσις", "νέμω", "νόμος", "νομος" and suggests: “C’est un partage réglé par l’autorité du droit coutumier […]"
«règle d’usage, coutume», puis «lois» ” etc. (1975: 79).\textsuperscript{52} The role of the double entendres may be more important than one would assume normally: cf. a case in Silburn (1950: 10), citing a pun with Sanskrit \textit{pūr}- (‘citadel’, ‘town’) and \textit{pūrusa}, the Primordial Man. There is no etymological connection between the two words (cf. EWAiA II 145 and 149–150). Another pun is discussed by Silburn (1950) on p. 11, and \textit{jeux étymologiques} are mentioned on p. 18. Elizarenkova, too, underlines the importance of such plays, e.g. on \textit{Agni}’s name, and elsewhere on \textit{hāri– ‘golden’, ‘bay’} (1995: 153.270), and for philosophical double entendres cf. McEvilley 2002: 47.48. [\textit{νόμος} also ‘tune’ – why?, contr. – Terpandros, Pythagoras (both from Samos!)]

Fortson’s excellent introduction, without passages either, informs us that naming was a serious ceremony, and on the basis of Vedic, Greek, Roman and Germanic tradition it may be inferred that in Pre–Indo–European (PIE) society, the mother recovered for – presumably – nine days after childbirth, and the child was then named on the tenth day.\textsuperscript{53} He also draws attention to the Vedic \textit{nāmadhéya– (‘name–placing’)} festival (2010: 38).\textsuperscript{54} (To “placing”/“putting” rather than “giving” cf. Giannakis (1993: 197[8] where the \textit{knees} are also dealt with).

Last but not least, Onians (1951), too, gives a broader, and useful survey on the issue where the function of generation is clearly understood and delineated (pp. 174 ff., and also 303 ff. “On the Knees of the Gods”).

Although most details refer to names as proper names we should conceive the ancients’ concept about the emergence of words, and finally, language, in a similar way. Indeed, the dialogue \textit{Cratylos}, which is about the \textit{names} (\textit{όνόματα}) does not make a clear difference between proper names, nouns and verbs.

[To integrate: “According to tradition the first Indian Grammarian was the god \textit{Indra}\textsuperscript{55}, who received instruction from the god \textit{Bṛhaspati}. […] Pāṇini’s stature in India was greater still; he is frequently referred to as “divine” in the literature and tradition has it that some verses of his

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. also GEW II 303, DELG 744, and Beekes 2010: 1006–7. [ide: Polomé – Mallory, Ademollo, Fr. Romano, van den Berg, Terrant, Smith (JIES 12)].

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. to this, Gonda 1970: 33. G. gives a detailed description of name–giving practices in Ch. VI, with regard, mainly, to India.

\textsuperscript{54} Pinault (2010), answering a question, informed his audience that in Tocharian, too – a relatively late attested language – the formula is present as \textit{ñem tā–} (B) and \textit{ñom tā–} (A). This corresponds to IE *\textit{h₂nem₁–m(e)yn} (cf. Beekes 2010: 1084) *\textit{dheh₁–}. He underlined that the verb is the more usual ‘put’ and not ‘give’ (Lecture 5, 10.09.2010). This fact, again, gives the impression that in Tocharian also a very ancient ritualism survived. The fact that the cognate formulas are present in Greek, Indo–Aryan and Tocharian suggests that the particular notions of fame were already present in PIE society (Polomé – Mallory 1997: 192). See there also the connection of ‘name’ (e.g. Gk \textit{ἴηλος}) and ‘fame’ proper (e.g. Gk \textit{kλέος}).

\textsuperscript{55} In Vedic times, the most important god! [ell.ni a mit.ból!] Cf. Allen 1948: 37.
Aṣṭadhyāyī were divinely dictated. Pāṇini’s treatment of Sanskrit syntax had two effects. It elevated the version of Sanskrit which he formalized to the level of a divine language, rendering it immune to the ordinary processes of linguistic change, and it provided a solid basis for speculations of the Indian schools of philosophy about the nature of language and meaning” (Davis 1978: IX–X).

Striking is the parallel with the Judeo–Christian God and Man (=Adam), put in Allen’s words: “And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto the man to see what he would call them: and whatsoever the man called every living creature, that was the name thereof. And the man gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to every beast of the field” (Allen 1948: 38). The text then goes on telling that “for the man there was not found a helper fit for him”, and the description of the woman’s creation follows.

The φύσει – θέσει problem [see below]: Allen argues – perfectly correctly in our opinion – that a third category should be added, that of a “divine” origin of language, and this could well belong to either of the former categories, according to whether the divine inventor is considered as a personification of nature or as the imposer of an arbitrary will, and, to be sure, the theory of a divine origin represents a more primitive level of thought since it calls for intellectual speculation. This is well illustrated by the Old Norse tradition in Snorra Edda, Gylfgaginning 9 (1948: 37).

The above should be enough to show that the origins of human language lay for the ancients in the divine sphere even if they were unable to establish a consistent theory for its provenience, as we are, still in our days, in great difficulties in explaining language origins.58

56. To be sure, the correct translation is “man”, since the Hebrew text has hā’ādām (defined form) whereas a personal name cannot take the definite article (Speiser 1964: 18).
57. καὶ ἐπιλαξαν ὁ θεὸς ἐτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντα τὰ θηρία τοῦ ἄγρου καὶ πάντα τὰ πετεινά τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, καὶ ἤγαγεν αὐτά πρὸς τὸν Ἀδὰμ ἰδεῖν τί καλέσαι αὐτά· καὶ πάν ὁ ἐδών ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸ Ἀδὰμ ψυχήν ζώσαν, τοῦτο ὄνομα αὐτῷ. 20 καὶ ἐκάλεσεν Ἀδὰμ ὄνοματα πάσι τοῖς κτήνεσι καὶ πάσι τοῖς πετεινοῖς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ πάσι τοῖς θηρίοις τοῦ ἄγρου (Genesis 2, 19–20, Tischendorf I, 1880, p. 3).
58. As a personal insight, I would remark that some linguistic constructions, with regard to IE, like certain verbal forms or the numbering system, show sometimes such a regularity that one is inclined to assume that they, indeed, have a learned origin, coming from scholars easily deified at a very early date, and seen as “gods”. In other cases the distributed functionality seems defective like with the non–event agent nouns vs. event agent nouns (suffixes “–ter– and “–tor–). The claim is disputed (cf. Fortson 2010: 124). Was this not a functional enough “prescription”? The Greek forms that would correspond to the IE reconstructions were confused already in the epic language where we find, along with δοτήρ – δώτωρ conceived as originals, also δωτήρ (and later, still, δότης and δῶτης). Fortson adds (ib.): “How old this difference is is likewise unclear, as well as how the two formations are ultimately related to each other.” It is generally agreed that the issue is unsolved.
The dialogue, then, discusses the “appropriateness” of “names”: how they cover or not what they denote. The philosophical importance of this first ever attempt is immense but the results, in the light of modern philology, of course, lack any professionalism and are, often childish. Our respect for Plato must not result in accepting the “etymologies” given there.\textsuperscript{59}

[Chinese parallel to the appropriateness of names: Lien (1994) on Xun Zi, 313–238 B.C.]

If “language came from gods”, and related “script was sacred”, it is easy to assume that the \textit{elements} and \textit{letters} (the “first things”, stoikheia, and their representations) “had sounds”. How to detect the traces of this concept in the classical tradition?

6. A phonological evaluation [\textit{[|]}: Semitic, cf. McCarter+ in Woodard!]

[for the phonological evaluation cf. Katonis 2010]

A discussion of the phonological system of Greek as a whole in different periods would well exceed the limits of a paper. We confine ourselves to the comprehensive study of three related phonemes which Lazzeroni (1995) gives a different explanation finding the parallels between Greek and Sanskrit convincing (he elegantly simplifies the Greek evidence reducing it to two opposed forms) and suggests a scalar continuum where the barytones would carry individualized contents and the oxytomes the more general ones. A good example would be Sanskrit \textit{vadhip}– and \textit{vadhr}–, both ‘transporter’. The first is the epithet of carts, the second of horses. A horse is more individual, he argues, than carts (p. 169). The idea may seem useful for name–giving: there, indeed, barytonesis always prevails. But is this a relatively late IE process as he maintains (p. 170)? Name–giving cannot be conceived as a late ceremony. See the material Hahn (1969) provides or Polomé – Mallory (1997[b]: 390) assigning PIE status. In his earlier paper, to which he refers, Lazzeroni repeats that this was a late development, or, better, an Indo–Iranian development (1991: 243). He also insists on a “scalar” nature of the category (p. 240). Still, one remains left with some doubts. So that we are correct we add that Rasmussen (2009, 1st and 2nd lecture, with hand–out) gave a rather complicated explanation for such developments where – in our opinion – different questions may be raised. The present writer is puzzled how strong and important the ideological factor with the IEs seems to have been: one would be inclined to assume, e.g., that a “‘god’ or ‘gods’ created the Heaven”. Morphological analysis gives the opposite proof. The PIE word for ‘god’ is a vrddhi–derivative meaning ‘one of, belonging to, or inhabiting the sky’. Should we venture the assumption that the sky \textit{already existed} for them, “made by others” before the IE conquest, and assume that “gods” emerged from among the conquerors? For a detailed linguistic explanation cf. Fortson (2010: 130[6.62]).

\textsuperscript{59.} [to comprise: Méridier 1931] “Nous savions déjà que la partie «étymologique» n’était qu’un jeu” (Méridier 1931: 29) [see also preceding!]
have been important through all the epochs of Greek linguistic history up to present: /b d g/, and to an attempt at gaining insights into their nature through ancient informations as well as modern linguistics. Their multiple importance lies both in semantics (mainly that of /b/) and in phonology. Whereas they underwent a spectacular change, i.e. /b d g/ (an assumed pronunciation for Ancient Greek) > /b d g/ (phonetic values in Modern Greek, but orthographically both “β” “δ” “γ”) the modern language developed a new set of stops of /b d g/, which correspond to the ancient assumed pronunciation in certain protected environments (orthographically “μπ” “ντ” “γκ”). The two sets, the voiced stops and the respective spirants or “opened” consonants constitute today a fully integrated system. This fact is important both for the Greek linguistic development, with regard to its consonant system, and preceding pre–Greek – IE phonological development. Our focus, however, will be the case of the first. If the Modern Greek system is integrated and, what is synonymous, symmetrical, the Ancient one was not, or better, it is to be asked it which sense and within what time limits it wasn’t. Indeed, there has been little concern in the specialist literature about the Greek consonant system. Even Allen (1987), who dedicates an exemplary study to vowels, ignores the consonants from a systemic point of view. What Schwyzter does comparing Ancient and Modern Greek phonological systems (1939: 179) is laudable but is nothing of a systemic presentation in phonological terms. As far as I know, it was Babiniotis who first tackled this problem with consistency (see e.g. 1985: 124–125), and for the last time Botinis (2009: 68–69.92–93, 2001: 64–65.89). Katonis (2010: 85–91) gives a detailed survey. In terms of phonology, the consonantal system of Ancient Greek is asymmetric and imbalanced, liable to move toward a balanced and symmetrically ordered pattern, whereas that of Standard Modern Greek constitutes a fully balanced and integrated pattern. Systems, if balanced and integrated, largely – though not absolutely – resist to further changes. In other words, the instability of Ancient Greek has arrived at a relative quiet point in the modern language.

The present writer has tried to prove that developments like g > g, or g > θ (certainly through g whether attested in written tradition or not), or g > g, or even θ > g/g61 – all attested in Greek, with regard also to the other mediae in question – are parts of a complex that could be called a “strength system” of which sonority or the lack of sonority are also parts.

60. To this, what we may call a teleological approach cf. Hock (1986: 164–166, and elsewhere). The problem of the phonological symmetry–asymmetry is, to a certain degree, a theoretical issue. Course–books usually tackle the vowel systems although analyzing consonantal systems is not unknown. Such a one–sided approach is seen in the otherwise very good treatise by Stonham (2009: 73–74).
61. I would not like to enlarge upon the ontological problem that a creation ex nihilo is impossible. Martinet (1955; 2005) may give some tentative ideas to solve the puzzle. “θ” is the “null set” used largely in phonology to denote either the source or the goal of a development.
Through such study, conclusions can be drawn not only on Greek linguistic developments and their phonetic reality in certain periods but also, beyond Greek and IE, on theoretical linguistic issues.

Can we deduce anything with regard to phonetics from the informations given by the ancient authors whose descriptions are considered by most scholars (e.g. Hatzidakis, Allen – check!) “imprecise” and “external”? If they were convinced that “letters had sounds” why were they unwilling or unable to go into details, and were they really?

/b/:

“θύειν με μέλλει καὶ κελεύει βῆ λέγειν” (Aristoph., Fr. 648[642], Kassel – Austin, PCG III 2, 1984, p. 338, with apparatus criticus).

One of the rare and unambiguous examples indicating pronunciation, i.e. [be:]. It was Aldus Manutius who, for the first time remarked in 1508 that sheep would not bleat like “vi”, the actual Greek pronunciation would suggest (cf. Allen 1987: 126–127). And yet, it will be argued that this, although assumably the original, was not the only pronunciation covered by the grapheme “b”, even with regard to classical times [check!]. Cf. Katonis 2010 II: 66–67 for several other instances for [b].


This has been interpreted as a proof for closed pronunciation (i.e. [b]) but Plato extends, with some inconsistency, the validity of his observation to “most of the other letters (στοίχεια)”. “Noise”, which is not defined precisely, could be understood in terms of the modern speech science as “obstruction”. However, both stops (such as /b/) and spirantized (such as /v/) belong to obstruents (see e.g. Katamba 1991: 55, or any modern course book of phonetics or phonology, also Stonham (2009: 271.255), cf. Katonis 2010 I: 32). One of the arguments of this paper will be that the “imprecise” descriptions of the ancient authors cover both closed and spirantized

pronunciation, *spirantization* or *opening* having begun at an earlier date than supposed generally.

(Arist. HA 535a–b):

/b d g/:


"Of these [i.e. soundless] three are smooth, k, p, t; three are rough, th, ph, ch; and three are medial, b, g, d. They are called medial because they are rougher than the smooth consonants, but smoother than the rough. b lies between p and ph; g lies between k and ch; and d lies between t and th" (translation by Robins 1993: 54).

Robins remarks that the "Greek linguists confused letters with sounds or phonemes", and that the "mésa (grammata)" were much discussed but their proper diagnosis of voice was not made by western linguists until they had learned the lessons of the Sanscritic Indian phoneticians (1993: 56). The phonetic nature of these "letters", again, remains unspecified, however, with regard to *voice*, I will indicate the possibility below that this, perhaps, was not so (cf. to this passage, Katonis 2010 I: 40). [check!]

Dionysius Halicarnassensis (D.H., 1st c. B.C.) – *De Compositione Verborum* (On Literary Composition): [v.s.]

"Of the so-called «voiceless letters,» which are nine in number, three are smooth, three rough, and three between these. The smooth are k, π, τ; the rough θ, φ, χ; the intermediate, β, γ, δ. They are severally pronounced as follows: three of them (π, φ, β) from the edge of the lips, when the

63. Terminologically, the best label is perhaps that of Lass which I am adapting. In his elegant *Phonology*, he standardizes the terminology and gives a good survey of *strength relations* (1984: 177 ff.) that are suitable to interpret the consonantal developments of Greek in question. *Opening* also allows for the opposite *closing*, a type of consonantal behaviour Greek also provides examples for.

64. "Τούτων [sc. τῶν ἀφώνων] ψιλὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τρία, κ π τ, δασέα τρία, θ ϕ χ, μέσα δὲ τούτων τρία, β | γ δ. μέσα δὲ εἰρήται, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ψιλῶν ἐστὶ δασύτερα, τῶν δὲ δασέων ψιλότερα, | καὶ ἐστι τὸ μὲν β μέσου τοῦ π καὶ φ, τὸ δὲ γ μέσου τοῦ κ καὶ χ, τὸ δὲ δ μέσου τοῦ | θ καὶ τ" (DT 6, 23–25, Lallot 1989, p. 46). See also the edition in GG I, I by G. Uhlig, 1883–1901 (Dionysii Thracis Ars Grammatica et Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem Grammaticam), reprinted: 1965, and Lallot’s translation: 'Parmi les muettes, trois sont simples – k p t –, trois rauques – th ph kh | et, par rapport à elles, trois sont moyennes – b g d –. Elles sont appelées | 'moyennes', parce qu’elles sont plus rauques que les simples et plus simples que | les rauques: b est la moyenne entre p et ph, g la moyenne entre k et kh, d la | moyenne entre t et th' (ib. p. 47).
mouth is compressed and the breath, being driven forward from the windpipe, breaks through the obstruction. Among these π is smooth, φ rough, and β comes between the two, being smoother than the latter and rougher than the former. This is one set of three mutes, all three spoken with a like configuration or our organs, but differing in smoothness and roughness. The next three are pronounced by the tongue being pressed hard against the extremity of the mouth near the upper teeth, then being blown back by the breath, and affording it an outlet downwards round the teeth. These differ in roughness and smoothness, τ being the smoothest of them, θ the roughest, and δ medial or common. This is the second set of three mutes. [...] but κ is pronounced smoothly, χ roughly, γ moderately and between the two" (translation by Rhys Roberts 1910: 149–150).

With regard to /b d g/, the remark "ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν ἄκρων" could indicate a closed pronunciation, one must however ask oneself if this was not a prescriptive rather than descriptive text. The whole work, a rather late one, served as a gift for a pupil of D.H. Allen did not find the description exact, ans similarly, Hatzidakis observed to "προσερειδομένης κατὰ τοὺς μετεώρους ὀδόν— | τας", that the tip of the tongue "leans upon" (προσερειδεῖται) the upper row of teeth whether one pronounces [d] or [g], or [g] or [g], and consequently the description is insufficient (see Katonis 2010 I: 41).

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65. I.e. “μέσον” or media. Allen gives a four page description to the mediae–problem (1987: 27–30) but does not arrive at a convincing explanation. The best he can offer, following a German idea, is that this, in a binary logic, might have been a "makeshift solution in terminology", a Verlegenhitsausdruck (p. 28).

66. Allen (1987: 14) remarks to this passage that the description of the dentals is "rather imprecise", and could possible refer to an alveolar contact. The respective sounds, however, are dental in Modern Greek, and also Middle Indian transcriptions of names on coins argue in favour of a dental rather than an alveolar contact. What is more important for this paper is, however, if the description is really imprecise, and if yes, in which sense.

67. "τῶν δὲ καλομενῶν ἀφῶνων ἐννέα ὄντων τρία | μὲν | ἐστι ψιλά, τρία δὲ δασέα, τρία δὲ μεταξύ τοῦ— | των ̅ ψιλά μὲν τὸ καὶ τὸ π ι καὶ τὸ τ ι, δασάδε δὲ τὸ δ καὶ τὸ ψ καὶ τὸ χ, κοινά δὲ ἀμφοῖν τὸ β καὶ τὸ γ | καὶ τὸ δ. φυσικά δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκαστὸν τρόπον τόνδε— | τρία μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν ἄκρων, ὅταν τοῦ στόματος | πιστύντος τότε προβαλλόμενον ἐκ τῆς ἀρτηρίας τὸ | πνεῦμα λύση τὸν δεσμὸν αὐτοῦ. καὶ ψιλὸν μὲν ἐστίν | αὐτῶν τὸ π, δασύ δὲ τὸ ψ, μέσον δὲ ἀμφοῖν τὸ β· | τοῦ μὲν γάρ ψιλότερον ἔστι, τοῦ δὲ δασύτερον. μία | μὲν αὐτή συζυγία τριῶν γραμμάτων ἀφῶνων ὀμοίῳ | σχῆμα λεγομένῳ, ψιλότητι δὲ καὶ δασύτητι διαμικρύβωσα— | φερόντων. τρία δὲ ἄλλα λέγεται τῆς γλύπτης ἄκρως τῷ στόματι προσερειδομένης κατὰ τοὺς μετεώρους ὀδόν— | τας, ἐπεὶ ὅταν τοῦ πνεῦματος ἀπορριπτικόν μετεστράφηκαν καὶ | τὴν διεξόδου αὐτῷ κατὰ περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ἀποδίδου— | στῆς διαλλάττει δὲ ταύτα δασύτητι καὶ ψιλότητι· ψιλόν | μὲν γάρ αὐτῶν ἐστιν τὸ τ, δασύ δὲ τὸ θ, μέσον δὲ καὶ ἐπίκοινον τὸ δ. αὐτῇ δευτέρᾳ συζυγίᾳ τριῶν | γραμμάτων ἀφῶνων. [...] | [...] τὸ μὲν ψιλὸς λέγεται, τὸ δὲ | χ δασέως, τὸ δὲ γ μετρίως καὶ μεταξύ ἀμφοίν" (D.H., Comp. [Περὶ Συνθέσεως Ὀνομάτων] XIV, pp. 55–57 UR; cf. Allen 1987: 145, and 14ff.).
Heliodorus (7th c. A.D.) to D.H.:

"Ζητεῖται <δὲ>, πῶς μὲν ψιλῶν ἔστιν ἴσχυρότερα, | τῶν δὲ δασέων ἀσθενέστερα. [...] | εἰ δὲ τὰ μέσα ταύτην οὐ πάσχει τὴν μετα- | βολὴν δασείας αὐτοῖς ἐπιφερομένης, ὁμολογοῦμενόν ἐστιν ὅτι ἴσχυρότερά | ἐστι τῶν ψιλῶν, [...] | <E 328> ἐλαβ’ ἡνία [...] | δασέων δὲ κατὰ τούτον τὸν | λόγον ἀσθενέστερά ἐστι τὰ μέσα, ἀτε δὴ [...] ψιλοῦσι τὰ πρὸ αὐτῶν” (GG I,III, p. 227[26-35]).

The passage would not fulfill the requirements for weakening and strengthening modern phonology posits for strength relations (like that by Lass e.g.) but nevertheless one is amazed that Heliodorus is aware of this dimension. He repeats his argumentation using, again, the words “ἵσχυρότερα” and “ἀσθενέστερα” (GG I,III, p. 503[8-9]). For the mediae, last but not least, he adds that these are “μέσην ἔχοντα δύναμιν” (ib. p. 502[23]), whatever with “δύναμις” is meant; one would assume that the word, as late as in the 7th c., is nearer to the actual meaning ‘force’ rather than to earlier ‘value’. Cf. Katonis 2010 I: 47–48.

/g/:

“γ [is pronounced] moderately and between the two” (Rhys Roberts 1910: 150)

“τὸ δὲ γ μετρίως καὶ μεταξύ ἀμφοῦ” Comp. XIV, pp. 57 UR;


Apollonius Dyscolus (1st half of the 2nd c. A.D): [also supra!]

(GG, Schneider – Uhlig) (Diss. 44–45) [+Lallot?, Buttmann?, Householder 1981?, Ph. Brandenburg, 2005]

(βδγ)

“Und der Dichter {Homer} durchwegs mit –n, wann immer ein Vokal folgt, um | offensichtlich durch die Hinzufügung des –n den Hiat der Vokale aufzufüllen” (Brandenburg 2005: 361[129]) [passage below?].

68. “καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς δὲ συνεχῶς διὰ τοῦ ν, ὅτε φωνῆει ἐπιφέροιτο, | σαφὲς ὅτι τὸ χασμῶδες τῶν φωνηέντων ἀναπληρῶν τῇ τοῦ ν προσθέσει” (A.D. Pron., GG II,1, Schneider – Uhlig, p. 5010-11 = Brandenburg 2005: 360[129], GG: some unimportant remarks on p. 76)
What is important here is Apollonius’ concern about *hiatus* and its “filling up” (ἀναπληρώ), a process he considers, indeed, “obvious” (σαφές). Understandably, he takes his examples from Greek literacy. For such environments (i.e. adjacency of two vowels or sonorants), I suggest the label Weakening/S trengheting environment (weakening, if a consonant weakens and disappears, and strengthening, if an original hiatus is filled up), and use it to interpret bidirectional strength processes. Brandenburg, beside a translation, does not give any comment; he only lists foregoing “ἐγών” (p. 598). [to expound below!]

“Die Böoter [...] *hión* >ich<, wie Tryphon [...] {sagt} aus nachvollziehbarer | Reduktion des –g–, damit auch der Eintausch des e– gegen das i– stattfinde” (Brandenburg 2005: 365[133]).

Brandenburg gives a good translation but he does not comment on the passage except for the aspiration (see. p. 599) which is not important in our case. Apollonius’ explanation, from a linguistic viewpoint, is insufficient; we can also ignore his teleology, a method quite frequent with ancient authors (cf. the subjunctive γένηται). But the passage is important. A.D. labels the gamma deletion “εὐλογος” (‘suitable, reasonable’; an equivalent to Brandenburg’s rendering, “nachvollziehbar”, would be ‘comprehensible’ in English). This means that, whatever the philosophical implications, an omission in pronunciation was considered by Apollonius normal. One remembers that earlier, Plato Comicus (5th–4th c. B.C.) derided such omissions in speech. A gamma deletion can only follow a respective opening (i.e. [g] > [g]) whether attested or not. I argue that the ancients

69 *Βοιστόι* <ιών> ὡς μὲν Τρύψων | [...], ὑφέσει εὐλόγω τοῦ γ, ἵνα καὶ τὰ τῆς μεταθέσεως τοῦ ξ εἰς | ἓ γένηται” (Pron., GG II,1, Schneider – Uhlig, p. 51); Brandenburg 2005, p. 364[133], GG: unimportant comments on p. 77). Although Apollonius’ position is teleological (cf. 74[21–28]) accounting for the well known ei > i change, the remark is a proof both for the pronunciation of /γ/ as /j/ and /ø/, respectively, well known from Modern Greek material and the fact that such pronunciation was regarded, at least in postclassical Greek, normal. (Cf. the phrase “ἀναλογώς – τερον ἀποφαίνονται” of Hdn. II 925[21–25], I 141[21–23]. The importance of the term “εὐλόγω” is shown in another passage of A.D. – otherwise with no significance for our main topic – where the verb “ἀλογέω” (‘to be unreasonable, to be irregularly formed’) is found: “ὁ στίχος ἡλογεῖτο” (GG II,II, 1910, p. 215.), translated by Householder as “wrongly believed” etc. (1981: 131[115]). In another passage, A.D. uses the form “ἡλογημένα” (Adv., GG II,1, p. 162[8]), in a similar attitude. Cf. Katonis 2010 I: 50). Antonymous εὐλογέω means ‘to speak well’, ‘to praise’, ‘to be prudent’. Εὐλογος is defined as ‘rationalis’ in GG II/III, p. 208 (Index). [to unite with the main text!]

70. Such a conclusion is granted by the whole of Martinet’s work in historical phonology, and especially by his epoch–making treatise, the *Economie* (1955; 2005). From the rich illustration material everywhere I cite the Spanish cases on [d] and [d] and [g] and [g] because there are some important similarities between Greek and Spanish, and where this principle is delineated (1955: 303[12.12]; with fewer examples, 2005: 228[8.8]ff.). Certainly, Lass’ construction (1984: 178) on phonological strength, too, very clearly predicts such processes. The chapter in question (pp. 169–202), indeed, may be the best of
did not realize the difference between closed and opened pronunciation but they realized the deletion [Ø]. Such a predisposition could have become a norm for Modern Greek, were not there opposite tendencies like “λαγός” (=λαός, ‘folk’, i.e. hiatus reduction with consonantal epenthesis, cf. Katonis 2010 I: 164), and the factor of orthography. With all this, Standard Modern Greek still preserves several examples of both deletion (i.e. “λόου” = ‘λόγου’) and intrusion (like αγόρι ‘boy’ and ἄνγυρος ‘unripe’, coming both from ἄωρος ‘untimely, premature’). For more historical examples cf. Katonis 2010 I: 161–164, and for a survey of /b d g/ in terms of Strength Phonology [to comprise Foley, Th.D. Cravens, cf. Katonis 2010 I, and the notion!], see Katonis ib. 151 ff. With regard to the different forms of “ἰώ” (=ἐγώ, ‘I’) cf. Katonis 2010 II: 161–185.71


“συμπαθέστερον” means, according to the Index of the Apollonius edition (GG II, III, 1910, p. 259), ‘cohaerens’, with reference to the passage in question. Nothing more is added. Does cohaerens (lit. ‘touching, adjacent’) mean ‘connected, pertaining’? The Liddell–Scott–Jones lexicon explains the meaning with “ἀναλογώτερον” (p. 1680). In a sense, A.D. was, indeed, engaged in the analogy-anomaly problem that was concerned first of all with morphological questions, but he was not polemic. He may be considered as “one of the great analogists of all times” (Householder 1981: 8–9). I ask myself, however, if the word refers to voice even if grammar did not realize voicing as we do it today. It is difficult to believe that a τ was spirantized the way δ was very probably, or was a fricative (affricate?) like ζ was. But it could become voiced that was, and still in our days is, a general tendency for Greek. A.D. enjoyed a great reputation – see Robins 1993: 15.29–31 (“maximus auctor artis grammaticae”) and elsewhere – and he was also known for terminological innovations. So that a “τ” [t] gets spirantized in the above sense, first voicing is needed and voicing is well thinkable. Cf. to all this Katonis 2010 I: 42.


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71. For the reasons here set out, one is reluctant to agree with the authority of Rix who thinks that the omission of /γ/ in script equals the spirantized pronunciation (1992: 83[93]). Rix has (ib.) also a short survey of the three mediae and their opening in an IE perspective.
“δυνάμει”:

Herodianus Grammaticus (Hdn., 2nd c. A.D.):
(βδγ)

“Μήτι οὖν Ταραντίνοι χωρίς τοῦ γ̄ προφερόμενοι τὴν λέξιν ἀναλογώ- |
τερον ἀποφαίνονται, ὦσπερ Ἄινθων ἐν δούλω Μελεάγρῳ
ολίοισιν υμών ἐμπέφυκ᾽εὐψυχία
καὶ ἐν Ἰοβάτῃ
χρήζω γὰρ ὄλιον μισθὸν αὐτὸς λαμβάνειν.
Πλάτων μέντοι ὁ κωμικὸς διαπαίζει τὴν λέξιν ὡς βάρβαρον” [i.e. the
adjective ὀλίγος appears as “ὁλίοισιν” and “ὁλίον”, without the γ] (Hdn., GG

Cf. to this, Katonis 2010 I: 43.50, II: 234. The word “ἀναλογώτερον”
demonstrates the influence of A.D.

“μετωνο- | μάσθη δὲ Φιάλεια δίχα τοῦ γ̄ ἀπὸ Φιάλου τινός” [i.e. the
Arcadian polis appears as “Φιάλεια”, without the γ in its name; Herodianus
attributes the lack to analogy] (Hdn., GG III,II, 29523-24, Lentz).

To “Φιάλεια”, cf. Katonis 2010 II: 301–307 with more than two
dozens of examples.

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/d/: Pl. Cra. 427A–B (Diss. 33) [to check with the Budé edition!]

“And again he [i.e. the giver of names] appears to have thought that
the compression and pressure of the tongue in the pronunciation of delta
and tau was naturally fitted to imitate the notion of binding and
rest” (translated by H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 147).72

This description, again, has been considered as a proof for a
pronunciation of the delta as [d], e.g. by Allen (1987: 31) although, G.N.
Hatzidakis, much earlier, draw attention to the fact that the ancient
informations are usually “external”, i.e. the authors did not know the
anatomy of speech production sufficiently. His opinion is that the
description is “unhappy” (cf. Katonis 2010: 33). The situation is much the
same with regard to the information on /g/.

72. “Τῆς δ’ αὖ τοῦ δέλτα συμπιέσεως καὶ τοῦ ταῦ καὶ ἀπερείσεως τῆς γλώττης τὴν
dύναμιν χρήσμον φαίνεται [sc. τὰ ὄνομα τιθέμενος] ἡγήσασθαι πρὸς τὴν μίμησιν
τοῦ δεσμοῦ καὶ τῆς στάσεως” (H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 146).
"a mute is that which with addition has no sound of its own but becomes audible when combined with some of the letters which have a sound. Examples of mutes are G and D. [...] But a detailed study of these matters properly concerns students of metre" (Arist. Po. 1456b, translated by W. Hamilton Fyfe, LCL 1965, p. 75).

[“mutes” have no “sounds” – contradiction or a detail coming from school–practice? Not all “letters have sounds”?]

Aristotle does not discuss /b/ in particular. With regard to /g/ and /d/, he continues the school tradition, and we do not learn anything about the phonetic value of the two sounds. It is regretted, however, that the metrics he refers to, possibly a second part of his Poetics, does not exist. (To an evaluation, cf. Katonis 2010 I: 37–40).

/g/: Pl. Cra. 427B (Diss. 33) [to check with the Budé edition!]

"Where the gliding of the tongue is stopped by the sound of gamma he [i.e. the giver of names] reproduced the nature of γλισχρόν (glutinous), γλυκύ (sweet), and γλοιῶδες (gluey) (H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 147)."

The opinions, just like in the case of /b/ and /d/, are divergent. I would add that imprecision apart, the fact that Plato examines /g/, supposed to be a velar consonant, thought to be a stop, together with the lateral approximant /l/, arouses reservations against phonetic accuracy. With this, we have three informations from the same author, in the same work, concerning /b d g/. The informations, however are not enough to decide the precise phonetic reality. But did Plato, and the ancients understand the difference between close and opened consonants (such as [d] and [d]?) And would they have been concerned with such details?


74. “ἡ δὲ ὀλισθανούσης τῆς γλώττης ἀντιλαμβάνεται ἢ τοῦ γάμμα δύναμις, τὸ γλίσχρον ἀπεμιμήσατο [sc. ὡς τὸ όνόματα τιθέμενος] καὶ γλυκὺ καὶ γλοιῶδες (H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 146)."
419c (Diss. 34) ("η[δ]ονή") – to comprise?

418A–E (Diss. 34)

"See, Hermogenes, how true my words are when I say that by adding and taking away letters people alter the sense of words so that even by very slight changes they sometimes make them mean the opposite of what they meant before; [...] I was going to say to you that this fine modern language of ours has turned δέον and also ζημιώδες round so that each has the | opposite of its original meaning, whereas the ancient language shows clearly the real sense of both words. [...] You know that our ancestors made good use of iota and delta, [...] But nowadays people change [...] delta to zeta, thinking they have a greater sound. [...] the name δυογόν is quite properly given to that which binds two together for the purpose of draught; now, however, we say ζυγόν. There are a great many other such instances" (Transl. by H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, pp. 117.119).

As to etymology, here and elsewhere, one cannot accept what Plato affirms, but this passage, I think pleads for a spirantized pronunciation of /δ/. What phonetically a spirantized pronunciation was – one would think of [d] as the simplest – is subject to discussion, in any case it was not [d]. The interchange of "δ" and "ζ" is well tangible in different parts and periods of the Greek material, and is always interpretable as opening. The change δ > ζ, whatever "ζ" covered phonetically, is attested linguistically. In addition, the "beautiful new" pronunciation (the "νέα φωνή [...] ή καλή") is not to be interpreted literally. I think the irony in speaking of "a greater sound" ("ώς δη μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα", cf. the subjective use of ώς [ – explain! Schw.]) is manifest. It is known how conservative the classical Greek and Roman societies were: the adjective "new" very often had a negative connotation. Socrates, who is speaking here, was famous for his irony; besides, like many others, he applauds to the "anceints" who "used the delta very well". Plato himself, was regarded in orthography as rather conservative (cf. to all this Katonis 2010 I: 34–35, with reference to a corpus containing

75. "θέασαι, ώ ΄Ερμογένες, ώς ἐγώ ἁλῆθή λέγω λέγων ὅτι προστιθέντες γράμματα καὶ ἐξαιροῦντες σφόδρα ἀλλοιούσα τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων διανοιάς, οὕτως ὡστε σμικρὰ πάνυ παραστρέφοντες ἐνίοτε τάναντα ποιεῖν σημαινένειν [...] ἐμελλόν σοι ἐρείν, ὅτι ἡ μὲν νέα φωνὴ ἡμῖν ἡ καλὴ οὕτω καὶ τούναντιν περιέστρεψε μηνύειν τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ ζημιώδες, ἀφανίζουσα ὅ τι νοεῖ, ἤ ἐπὶ παλαιὰ ἀμφότερον δηλοὶ ὃ βουλέσαι τούνομα. [...] οἶσθα ὅτι οἱ παλαιοὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι τῷ ἑώτα καὶ τῷ δέλτα εὐ μάλα ἄχρωντα, [...] νῦν [...] ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ δέλτα ζῆτα, ὃς δὲ μεγαλοπρεπέστερα ὄντα. [...] ἑπιστάσεσθαι δυογόν δικαίως· νῦν δὲ ζυγόν. Καὶ ἀλλὰ πάμπολλα οὕτως ἔχει" (Pl. Cra. 418A–E, H.N. Fowler, CLC 1926, p. 118).
76. (See below?/above? [decide!] what Apollonius Dyscolus writes on the "affinity" of δ and ζ – in footnote?).
examples with “ζ” that corresponds to /δ/). A similar passage in Cratylus is 419b. For “μεγαλοπρεπέστερα”, cf. Katonis 2010 I: 50.

419b (cf. Diss. 34)

“And likewise in the case of ζημιῶδες, if you restore the ancient delta in place of the zeta, you will see that the name, pronounced δημιῶδες, was given [...]” (Transl. by H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 121).77

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Aristid. Quint. (Jahn, Winnington–Ingram 1963) (Diss. 47–49) (βδγ)

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S.E. M. (=adversus Mathematicos) (Diss. 49) (βδγ)

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D.L. (H.S. Long, OCT I–II, 1965[1966]) (Diss 50) (βδγ)

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Luc. Jud.Voc. (Judicium Vocalium) (γ+)

The mediae (μέσα) problem: the real nature of these stops was never made explicit in the grammarian tradition (cf. Allen 1987: 29–32 [+Allen 1981: 120 – Diss. p. 52+Bibl.?]). I would like, as a tentative explanation, to suggest an analysis in the weakening–strengthening (or lenition–fortition) phonological complex (cf. Katonis 2010 I: 47ff.; 197ff.).

Cf. the remark "τὸ δὲ γ̅ μετρίως" of D.H. (Comp. XIV, pp. 55–57 UR)

77. “Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ ζημιῶδες, ἐὰν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαῖαν φωνήν ἀποδῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆτα δέλτα, φαίνεται σοι κείσθαι τὸ ὄνομα [...]” (H.N. Fowler, LCL 1926, p. 120)
Es gibt 3 Sprechwerkzeuge: Zunge, Zähne, Lippen. Das π spricht man aus, indem man die Lippenränder zusammenpreßt, so daß kein Hauch hindurchgeht. Das ϕ spricht man aus, indem man die Lippen ganz öffnet und viel Hauch hindurchläuft. Beim β aber, das ebenso mit den Lippenrändern gesprochen wird, ... öffnet man weder die Lippen ganz wie beim ϕ, noch preßt man sie ganz zusammen wie beim π, sondern läßt sparsam eine mittlere Menge Atem ausströmen. Daher liegt das β in der Mitte zwischen π und ϕ, und nicht etwa anderer Laute, da es an derselben Stelle wie jene beiden gebildet wird.

Ebenso liegt das γ in der Mitte zwischen κ und χ, weil auch es an derselben Stelle wie jene ... gebildet wird. Das κ wird ausgesprochen, indem sich die Zunge wölbmt und an den Gaumen preßt, | ohne den aufprallenden Luftstrom hindurchzulassen. Beim χ jedoch preßt sich die Zunge nicht an den Gaumen und haftet an ihm, sondern läßt viel Luftstrom hindurch. Mit derselben Zungenstellung wird das γ ausgesprochen, nur daß sie weder am Gaumen einen völligen Verschluß wie beim κ noch eine völlige Öffnung wie beim χ bildet, sondern dem Atem einen mittleren Durchgang gewährt“ (check if omissions are necessary here, or full Greek text below; Arens 1969: 27–28).
Arens acknowledges the achievement of Dionysius Thrax and adds the comments by Mel. in translation but does not go into details.

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[Comments to these passages, or similar commentaries, s. p. 621?]

(Katonis 2010 I 47ff. 197ff. 204, II: 33.102.112).

| "ἀνεύ τοῦ ἃ χρῆσιν", "μέσην τινά διέξοδον", |
| "τὴν ἀνεύ τοῦ ἃ χρῆσιν ὡς βάρβαρον", ὑφέσει |
| εὐλόγῳ τοῦ ἃ" ["analogists – anomalists"] |

- Xatzidakis: "σφόδρα ἀσθενής".
- g/g/j
- ὑφαίρεσις
- ἥφασις
- εὐλόγος, ἱλογεῖτο
- ἀκατάλληλον [cf. A.D. Συντ. I 1, 2, 8 x.: √ + Notes du livre I, p. 8]
- "χωρὶς τοῦ ἃ ἀναλογώτερον"
- Pamphylian

- Fourquet

- beghadhkephath

- "τῆς γλώττης [...] προσερειδομένης"
- "ἐφαπτομένης καὶ μὴ ἐφαπτομένης" (Mel.)
- "γραμμάτων ἐν ξυλλαβαῖς"

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